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Department of Law, Tallinn University of Technology
For decades, the British philosopher of science Nicholas Maxwell has been pro-
moting a new approach to science called aim-oriented empiricism. Maxwell’s basic
claim is that the regular way of doing science, called standard empiricism, is un-
tenable because it does not account for the basic general assumptions that scien-
tists actually adhere to without acknowledgment. Standard empiricism is unable to
make sense of the progress of science as it is happening. e alternative approach
that Maxwell advocates, aim-oriented empiricism, acknowledges some basic meta-
physical assumptions, comprehensibility, unity and simplicity as inherent parts of
science itself. By including these metaphysical assumptions into science, Maxwell
is looking for ways to make sense of the progress of science from a philosophical
perspective. is paper challenges Maxwell’s claim with the help of another new
approach to science, practical realism. While the founder of practical realism, Rein
Vihalemm, claims that his approach is closely related to Maxwell’s views, he does
not acknowledge any need for metaphysics in science.
Keywords: Maxwell, standard empiricism, aim-oriented empiricism, metaphysical
assumptions, Vihalemm, practical realism
1. Introduction
e article addresses the ‘classical’ problem of the relationship between sci-
ence and metaphysics, introducing as a new angle the possibility of meta-
physics as an inherent part of science and not as something committed to
stay outside of its limits. In this respect, the issue is only partly classical.e
article discusses metaphysics and science but combines them in a novel way.
It is common knowledge that, throughout the course of history, science
has continuously taken over problems that have belonged to the realm of
metaphysics. At the same time, it is not known whether this process will
continue forever or at some point science will no longer need the ‘guidance’
of metaphysics. Some scientists, such as Stephen Hawking, believe that for
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46 Metaphysics: Inside or Outside of Science?
us this is already the state of aairs, that not only metaphysics but also the
whole philosophy is done. ese scientists do not seem to understand that
the possibility of the end of philosophy couldmark the end of science as well.
Interestingly, there are also philosophers who believe that we do not re-
ally need metaphysics or even philosophy altogether in order to make sense
of science, that there can be philosophy of science without philosophy. Tra-
ditionally, the latter has been the naturalist approach to science. Naturalists
aim to study science by means of applying their own method for doing that.
In that case we have science studies rather than the philosophy of science,
even though we keep the philosophical stance to science. Recently, the late
Estonian philosopher of science Rein Vihalemm added a new interesting
development in this topic, gathering these kinds of approaches under a new
approach in the philosophy of science, called practical realism. While the
sudden tragic death of ReinVihalemm in summer 2015 le his new approach
in an underdeveloped stage, the core of practical realism is in place and open
to discussions for philosophers of science and to possible developments as a
new thread of realist thought in making sense of science.
e main task of this paper is to assess Nicholas Maxwell’s claim con-
cerning the need to acknowledge metaphysical assumptions in science.is
acknowledgement is the core of Maxwell’s conception of aim-oriented em-
piricism (AOE). It is important to understand that, according to Maxwell,
themetaphysical assumptions have to be part and parcel of science itself, not
anything supporting science from outside of its boundaries. e approach
is a critical one, arguing that naturalism and practical realism with some of
its sources provide an interesting frame of reference for the criticism. By
all evidence, no conclusive proof on whether metaphysical assumptions are
necessary or not will be presented to make sense of science and its progress.
Rather it is the case that both approaches are possible: one in which meta-
physical assumptions are required and the other where they are not, a kind
of philosophy of science without philosophy.
2. Understanding sciencewithoutmetaphysics—the practical re-
alism of Rein Vihalemm and its background
Less than a decade ago, the Estonian philosopher of science Rein Vihalemm
began developing a new approach in the philosophy of science that he called
practical realism (Vihalemm 2011). Vihalemm presented the core of practi-
cal realism according to the following ve theses:
1. Science does not represent the world ‘as it really is’ from a god’s eye
point of view;
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2. e fact that the world is not accessible independently of theories—
or, to be more precise, paradigms (practices)—developed by scien-
tists does not mean that Putnam’s internal realism1 (or social con-
structivism) is acceptable;
3. Science as a theoretical activity is only one aspect of it (of sciences)
as a practical activity whose main form is scientic experiment
which, in its turn, takes place in the real world, being a purpose-
ful and critically theory-guided constructive, manipulative, mate-
rial interference with nature;
4. Science as practice includes a normative aspect, too, and thatmeans,
in its turn, that the world as it is actually accessible to science is not
free from norms either;
5. Although neither naive nor metaphysical, it is certainly realism as
it claims that what is ‘given’ in the form of scientic practice is an
aspect of the real world. (Vihalemm 2011, 48)
If we consider metaphysical statements as positions that are not empiri-
cally testable, as NicholasMaxwell does, then eliminatingmetaphysics is not
emphasised here, although the wish to do so is apparent. Practical realism
is not a metaphysical approach, nor is it even anything involving or accept-
ing metaphysics in close relationship with science. Still, Vihalemm does not
specically aim to do away with metaphysics either. e task simply comes
about as a natural part of practical realism so that nothing metaphysical in
the above-mentioned sense is needed in order to make sense of science, to
understand how science works. is is so even despite the emphasis on the
normative essence of science. e normative aspect that Vihalemm has in
mind is nothing metaphysical. It serves a practical purpose or, to put it
dierently, comes into the process of scientic research with the way how
the researcher constructs the object of research. However, if a scientist do-
ing research has metaphysical assumptions in her mind it opens a window
for bringing these assumptions into science. Vihalemm seems to have over-
looked this option or perhaps he did not considermetaphysical assumptions
as anything normative.
Vihalemm’s views concerning the role of metaphysics in science have
evolved over several decades. Here it is important to explain in more detail
how to understand naturalism as philosophy of science without philosophy.
1 Hilary Putnam’s internal realism involved rejecting the “God’s Eye Point of View” that Put-
nam thought was characteristic of metaphysical realism. For Putnam, internal realism in-
volved a commitment to the idea that truth is somehow epistemically constrained, and to
some version of conceptual relativism.
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e main claim of an interesting paper by Vihalemm (1993), published in
Estonian, is simple—all scientic disciplines derive from natural philoso-
phy.erefore, the same should happen in science studies. A philosophy of
science without philosophy claims that there is no philosophical foundation
of science outside of science itself (Vihalemm 1993, 1800).is may be true
but, as will be shown below, the lack of philosophical foundation of science
outside of science does not necessarily mean that there is no need for meta-
physical assumptions inside science. Obviously, this is not what Vihalemm
had in mind at this point. It seems that Vihalemm’s intention at this point
was to get rid of any kind of philosophy in contemporary science.e same
is perhaps not the case with his practical realism. In 1993, Vihalemmwas ad-
vocating the naturalist approach to the philosophy of science.e term ‘nat-
uralist’ points at something natural, something close to nature. Vihalemm
argued, however, that the essence of the naturalist approach to science does
not necessarily lie in its proximity to nature. Naturalism can be taken as
nonphilosophical, as an attempt to study science using its own method.
As the naturalist philosophy of science aims to study sciencewith its own
methods, it seems that there must be a direct link to positivism. However,
this is not necessarily the case. e naturalist approach is also against the
positivist philosophy and epistemology of science. Positivism that evolved
into logical empiricism did not achieve the status of empirical scientic re-
search. It could be argued that logical empiricism aimed at discardingmeta-
physics, which it did not succeed in, though. It is dicult not to agree
with Stephen Toulmin’s observation that logical positivism simply rewrote
Hume’s and Mach’s metaphysics into Russell’s and Whitehead’s symbolism
(Toulmin 1969, 40).
e position of a follower of naturalism might be called ‘historiograph-
ical positivism’. Her approach to the world is that of an empiricist describer.
e points to consider here are the following:
1. Objects of scientic research have to be set by the a priori cognition
in the sense of Kant;
2. ere is the classifying-historical-descriptive type of science (from
biology to the humanities) in which cognition has to be set in place
aer the object of research has been dened. (Vihalemm 1993, 1804)
e nonphilosophical (naturalist) philosophy of science can work with
the latter type of science but it cannot work with the former. e type of
cognition that corresponds to the rst point is characteristic to physics-like
sciences, i.e., physics and the part of chemistry that deals with the laws of na-
ture.e researcher does not have a direct connection to reality here as it is
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mediated by a construction created by the scientist herself. A philosophical
account is needed in order to make sense of this type of science.
e nonphilosophical (scientic) theoretical knowledge of the second
type presupposes the empirical experience, while preserving the latter pre-
supposes the theoretical.
By all evidence, this is the dierence between the two types of science
that motivated Vihalemm to put a questionmark at the end of the title of his
paper, actually asking whether it is possible to have a philosophy of science
without philosophy (Vihalemm 1993).e answer is that it is only partly so.
Only the classifying-historical-descriptive type of science acknowledges the
naturalist philosophical approach. No metaphysics is required here. us,
it is quite dierent, from the rst type of science that requires priority of
cognition over the object.
ere is a wish to study science by applying its own method, which is
possible if we are interested merely in the statistical part of the sociology of
science. If we need to understandwhat science is and how it works, however,
we are back into philosophy in a quite traditional sense.ere is a place for
the science of science on the academic landscape but this does not mean
that philosophy of science is nished. Science keeps developing. erefore,
we need to keep asking the question what is this thing called science and
correcting or ne-tuning the answers.
3. Metaphysics or methodology?
e aim of this paper is not to prove conclusively that we do need meta-
physics in order to make sense of science, to account for its success, but
rather to assess the claim of Nicholas Maxwell that some metaphysical as-
sumptions have to be part of science and to compare Maxwell’s views to the
practical realism of Rein Vihalemm.e latter himself believed that his ap-
proach is sucient to account for the success of science at least as well. It
is a claim of special interest, however, that Vihalemm considers Maxwell’s
understanding of science, his AOE, closer to practical realism, despite the
dierent attitude to the need for the metaphysical assumptions in science.
is issue will be addressed below in more detail.
According to Maxwell, AOE emerges as a solution of a dilemma. He
spells it out as follows: In order to proceed in improving knowledge wemust
make some assumption about the ultimate nature of the universe. In order
to proceed successfully we must make an assumption that is near enough
correct. If our assumption is wrong then it would be dicult to discover
the basic mistake (Maxwell 1998, 6). It may be not obvious to speak about a
dilemma here but this is how Maxwell puts it.
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AOE, according to Maxwell, emerges as follows: First, we need to make
explicit the cosmological assumption that may be regarded as being implicit
in our current methodology and then extract from here a hierarchy of in-
creasingly attenuated metaphysical cosmological assumptions concerning
the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe (Maxwell 1998, 6).
Bringing in the idea of a hierarchy of assumptions justies the term ‘aim-
oriented’. e goal is to arrive at assumptions which are such that doubt-
ing them cannot help the growth of knowledge (Maxwell 1998, 6). us,
Maxwell is aiming at ideal assumptions, such that need no longer be cor-
rected.
For several decades already, Maxwell has criticised the current approach
to science that he calls standard empiricism (SE).Maxwell says that SE is un-
tenable because of the requirement that nothing should be taken for granted
in science if there is no empirical evidence for that. “e collapse of standard
empiricism means that it is impossible to do science without some perma-
nent assumption about the nature of the universe beingmade independently
of empirical considerations” (Maxwell 1998, 4). According to Maxwell, this
is the ‘ocial’ claim of scientists that does not hold true in reality. Maxwell
believes that somemetaphysical assumptions are always applied by scientists
but not knowingly. Normally, scientists consider that the world is compre-
hensible and they prefer unied theories over disunied ones as well as sim-
ple theories over more complicated ones. us, metaphysical assumptions
are argued to be present in science and they have to be given credit. Ac-
knowledging themetaphysical assumptions in science is the core ofMaxwell’s
AOE, his new understanding of science in which metaphysics has a ‘natural’
place as an inherent component of science itself, not outside of it.
Here a question could emerge whether the metaphysical assumption of
comprehensibility precedes the goal of preferring unied theories or it de-
rives from the desire to avoid disunity.is issue is not claried inMaxwell’s
works. However, it looks as if the assumption of comprehensibility is prior
to everything concerning scientic research. How to understand this dier-
ence seems to be a major challenge. How to make sense of the distinction
that is very important to Maxwell, namely that the metaphysical assump-
tions he advocates are not outside of science but its immanent ingredients?
Perhaps, analysing the few critiques of AOE that are available would help to
determine that.
Somewhat surprisingly, Maxwell’s AOE has not attracted too much at-
tention among philosophers of science. Still, some critical approaches to-
wards it are available.emost notable ones were presented byDavidMiller
and F. A. Muller. Miller briey addresses the question of the metaphysical
assumptions, saying that neglecting the disunied theories has nothing to
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do with presuming any kind of metaphysical assumptions, just like exclud-
ing God hypotheses does not mean that science makes a big assumption of
atheism (Miller 2006, 92). Obviously, science does not make such an as-
sumption and does not need to. At least this is the general perception. How-
ever, the validity of Miller’s comparison can be challenged. One could claim
that science does not aim at saying anything about God in any respect. How-
ever, it aims at making claims about reality. e latter appears in a dierent
way depending on whether we consider the option that it can be adequately
described by disunied theories or not. us, making assumptions about
empirically testable reality becomes part and parcel of the activity called sci-
ence. God hypotheses are and have to be out of science. Any assumptions
that refer to the power of science tomake sense of empirical reality, however,
remain inside it.
Maxwell has his own response to Miller’s criticism, of course. By giv-
ing it, Maxwell actually contradicts himself, countering David Miller’s criti-
cism with an example of a disunied theory which has been given attention
in science—namely, a rival to the Newtonian theory presented by Maurice
Levy in 1890 (Maxwell 2005, 188). Such a counterexample proves that some
disunied theories are given attention by scientists and therefore there is no
persistentmetaphysical assumption that only unied theories t in. Maxwell
acknowledges this. is position contradicts his own view that a persistent
claim for preferring only unied theories is permanently present in doing
science. It is true that normally unied theories are preferred. However,
the episode in the history of science concerning the theory of Maurice Levy
shows that David Miller is quite erroneous in saying that disunied theo-
ries are totally excluded from science. erefore, the comparison with God
hypotheses does not quite hold.
F. A. Muller (2004; 2008) has given much more attention to Maxwell’s
idea of the necessity of metaphysics in science. As the title of the second,
lengthier paper suggests, Muller’s priority is defending constructive empiri-
cism rather than criticising Maxwell’s AOE. Muller’s criticism is rich in an-
alytic detail. Muller’s nal conclusion is that science really makes perma-
nent assumptions about the universe but these do not belong tometaphysics
as they are strongly dependent on the results of empirical research (Muller
2008, 155). Muller is ready to call the assumptions Maxwell has pointed out
methodological and he is not alone in this observation. For instance, Ken-
neth Westphal shared this view during his open discussion with Maxwell at
the 2013 conference in Tallinn that the author had the chance to witness.
In order to give an assessment here, it is worth reminding what is nor-
mally meant by methodology. e term applies to the basis or underpin-
nings of doing research. Sometimes, somewhat mistakenly, also to a set of
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methods that are used to do research. Methodology can be understood as a
philosophical discipline but it is also directly connected to empirical expe-
rience. is gives the understanding of methodology good justication to
what F. A. Muller and Kenneth Westphal are attributing to Maxwell. us,
Muller is actually claiming that the assumptions that Maxwell understands
as nontestable can still be submitted to empirical control, although in a me-
diated way.
e latter may make sense if one asks whether it is possible to claim that
any metaphysical statement ever has been immune to the impact of the re-
sults of empirical research. is can be done if one remains strictly inside
the realm of theoretical philosophy not admitting any empirically testable
statements. Science as a practical process, however, can hardly contain any
elements that are not inuenced by empirical experience. Does this mean
that there cannot be any metaphysics in science in principle? is question
will be revisited below when comparing Maxwell’s views with practical re-
alism. Given the assumptions that are at stake, namely, comprehensibility,
unity and simplicity, is it not a little too abstract for methodology? Meta-
physics looks a more appropriate term in this respect.
Recently,Maxwell himself has given a detailed overview of the criticisms
together with his answers to the critics (Maxwell 2015). In the corresponding
paper, hemanages to single out altogether sixteen objections to the argument
that persistent acceptance of unied theories means that physics makes a
substantial metaphysical assumption about the universe (Maxwell 2015, 13–
14). For obvious reasons, they all cannot be analysed in detail here.emost
controversial point seems to be the one about there being endlessly many
empiricallymore successful disunied rivals to the accepted unied theories
that can be concocted. Maxwell may be right about the possibility of con-
cocting (endlessly) many disunied rivals that are empirically more success-
ful than the accepted unied theory. However, being unied is not the only
and perhaps even not the most important reason for picking the theories
that achieve prominence in science. Maxwell points out that we can concoct
as many equally empirically successful but disunied rival theories as we
please by modifying any accepted fundamental physical theory for some as
still untested predictions only (Maxwell 2015, 14).is is true. However, the
question remains whether not accounting for all these disunied rival the-
ories means that scientists are making a metaphysical assumption in favour
of unied theories. It may well be that they rather follow the principles of
comprehensibility and simplicity simply for pragmatic reasons, i.e., to make
the research process smoother and better comprehensible in itself. Actually,
this seems to be exactly what Maxwell is pointing out. Only he calls these
principlesmetaphysical assumptions. Some other philosophers, such as F. A.
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Muller andKennethWestphal call themmethodological assumptions. Is the
solution to the problem of how to call them simply a matter of taste? It looks
as it really is, to some extent. However, the methodological approach to any
practical research can be altered. Dierent bases to develop research may
be tried. e principles Maxwell is addressing, however, are to stay forever
as inherent components in the appropriate type of science—aim-oriented
empiricism.ere is no way to get rid of them.
According to Maxwell, in SE scientists do not recognise the presence of
metaphysics in science, although it is there. However, calling these assump-
tions methodological does not turn things around. If Maxwell’s critique of
SE hits the target then it appears that the methodological principles of unity
or simplicity are not recognised by scientists either. Calling the phenomenon
by another name would not eliminate the problem.
us, there is still a need for the change from SE to AOE even if we do
not acknowledge the presence of metaphysics in science, of hypotheses that
cannot be tested by the scientic method in principle or even the need for
them. It is important to acknowledge that metaphysical or methodological
assumptions have to be present in science as an inherent component, not as a
foundation holding it or a guiding light attracting it forward. In that respect,
Nicholas Maxwell has come forward with an interesting new interpretation
of the essence of science even if he cannot conclusively prove the need for
precisely metaphysical assumptions in science.
4. AOE and practical realism
e founder of practical realism, Rein Vihalemm, has claimed that Nicholas
Maxwell’s approach to science is close to his own.e issue has to be claried
in detail because there are at least two instances in which practical realism
and AOE do not come close at all, at least not until quite recently.
is is how Vihalemm explains in the most basic terms the similarity
of Maxwell’s approach to his own: “Maxwell proceeds from science as prac-
tice in the sense that he intends to make explicit presuppositions, aims and
methods which are implicit in scientic practice and thanks to which its—as
an aim-oriented rational action—progress has actually been achieved” (Vi-
halemm 2011, 56). Vihalemm compares Maxwell’s approach to science with
his ownpractical realism-based view and observes that items 1, 2, 4 and 5 (see
above) of his main theses of practical realism are all important to Maxwell.
It is just the third thesis, the one addressing the essence of scientic experi-
ment that traditionally has been not interesting to Maxwell. One can claim,
of course, that four out of ve would not save the day if it is the most focal
one from the practical point of view that is missing.
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Vihalemm, however, chooses a more general approach. In this con-
text, neglecting to mention the experiment byMaxwell does not matter that
much. Vihalemm observes that Maxwell’s criticism of SE meets with ap-
proval in practical realism. Still, in practical realism the question concern-
ing metaphysics does not come up as a dilemma between SE and a view-
point that involves metaphysical assumptions. According to Vihalemm, this
dilemma is due to Maxwell’s traditional approach that is based on the Pop-
perian distinction between scientic and metaphysical statements, the for-
mer ones being empirically testable and the latter ones being out of reach of
empirical research by denition (Vihalemm 2011, 57–58). Practical realism,
however, rather adheres to Joseph Rouse’s understanding of how scientic
cognition works:
We are already engaged with the world in practical activity, and the
world simply is what we are involved with. e question of access to
the world, to which the appeal to observation was a response, never
arises.e important categories for characterizing the ways the world
becomes manifest to us are therefore not the observable and unob-
servable. Wemust ask instead about what is available to be used, what
we have to take account of in using it, and what we are aiming toward
as a goal. (Rouse 1987, 143)
In practical realism, as well as in Rouse’s approach, science is not con-
strued abstractly as a system of knowledge. It is understood as a practical
activity (Vihalemm 2011, 58). Maxwell, however, adheres to the traditional
distribution of the world into observables and unobservables. As the unob-
servables are out of reach of empirical testing, without this distinction, our
current question about metaphysical assumptions can never arise.
As metaphysics is about the nontestable, the unobservables are impor-
tant for our current analysis. ey are important from the point of view of
Maxwell’s AOE. Rein Vihalemm, on the other hand, did not see the need
for metaphysics in science. He believed that there is no need for accounting
for metaphysics while trying tomake sense of science in any respect, neither
something that lies outside of the limits of science nor as its inherent part.
As indicated, the understanding of Joseph Rouse is the same in this respect.
e positions of Rouse and Vihalemm are well argued. However, the big
question remains. How to account for the nonempirical beliefs a scientist
encounters while doing research? From Vihalemm’s point of view, this is
perhaps the normative part of science. But even if so, the unobservables are
still there.
Connecting to practical realism an approach that disregards the scien-
tic experiment may seem unusual. e latter is obviously central in the
practical realist approach. Scientic experiment was out of Maxwell’s fo-
cus until 2015. Ever since, Maxwell has suddenly started to use the example
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of the experiment to give more ground to his position concerning the em-
pirical justication of physical theories. Aer all, it is not possible to avoid
addressing the experiment in the context of our main problem. Maxwell is
certainly right in claiming that experiments in physics are oen dicult to
perform correctly (Maxwell 2015, 15). e initial results of the experiments
oen clash with the predictions of accepted theory. In other words, the ini-
tial results sometimes refute accepted theories. e theories, however, are
rarely questioned.ese are normally the results of the experiments that are
rejected. Something in the setup of the experiment will be adjusted until the
outcome ts the theory. Of course, scientists do not always operate in this
manner but the pattern is visible. It is hard to counter Maxwell’s statement
“If physics gave equal weight to unied and disunied theories, experiments
would persistently favour the latter” (Maxwell 2015, 16). erefore, accord-
ing to Maxwell, even the analysis of the experiment supports the idea of the
presence of permanentmetaphysical assumptions in science that are not no-
ticed in SE but will be acknowledged in AOE.
Wemust also consider that the role of experiment has been changing for
quite a while already (Müürsepp 2012). Today, we cannot adhere strictly to
the repeatability requirement. We still manipulate nature while experiment-
ing but we have started to recognise the diculty concerning obtaining the
same or sometimes even similar results for several times. ese changes do
not diminish the role of the experiment in practical research. We just need
to correct our understanding of the experiment.
e situation concerning empirical research can be interpreted as nature
telling the physicists that it is more complicated than their theories claim.
Maxwell claims that the physicists refuse to listen to this call (Maxwell 2015,
15). is, however, is just partly true. Quite obviously, most of the physi-
cists are very well aware of the situation, i.e., of the limited power of physical
theories. e theories rather just form a limiting and guiding framework
that help to develop the experimental dialogue with nature. It is worth re-
minding what Rein Vihalemm lists as the third point of the practical realist
‘manifesto’.e experiment is theory-guided but at the same time it is a con-
structive and manipulative interference with nature. e experiment takes
place in the real world.e theory is born in the head of the scientist. It can
have only a remote connection to the real world. Does this mean that there
are no theories in physics, that the latter is a practical activity by denition
and the theories belong to metaphysics altogether? In reality, however, it is
not the case that there is no theoretical physics and everything nonexperi-
mental is called metaphysics. Also, physical theories can hardly be classied
under methodology as they are more narrowly limited to specic subelds
of research.
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is brings us back to the question of what is the real meaning of Max-
well’s advocating the need to introduce metaphysics into science.e theo-
ries are in science anyway and there is no obvious need to call them meta-
physical because, at least ideally, they can be empirically tested. However,
this is clearly not enough for Maxwell. e question is about giving pref-
erence to some type of theories over the others. As scientists themselves
are doing this this process obviously takes place in science. However, giv-
ing preference to unied theories over disunied ones and simple theories
over more complicated ones is not necessarily anything metaphysical. It can
well be understood as a practical principle along the lines of the approach
of Joseph Rouse (see above). e activity could be even called following a
certain methodology, if we wish.is seems to be F. A. Muller’s perspective
to the issue.
It seems that we have managed to narrow down the question of dier-
ence between the methodological perspective of F. A. Muller (and Kenneth
Westphal) and the metaphysical perspective of Maxwell. e former relies
on the connection between the most general assumptions and empirical re-
search. If the assumptions are methodological then they are, at least to some
degree, remotely testable. Maxwell’s metaphysical assumptions, however,
are not testable by denition in the classical Popperian sense. Still, they are
something that are carried along with science unknowingly in SE but know-
ingly in AOE.us, recognising the methodological (but not metaphysical)
general assumptions in science does not enable us to leave SE behind and
accomplish the decisive turn to AOE. According to Maxwell, acknowledg-
ing the need formetaphysical (nontestable) components in science is crucial
for this important change.
It may look as we are le with just one very general assumption that is
not science and perhaps not methodology as well—namely, the belief that
the universe is comprehensible. It is really something that any researcher
has to believe in. Otherwise, what is the point of doing research if we are not
able to make any sense of the results?is is really something that every re-
searcher presumes, either consciously or not. In this sense, we can agree that
metaphysics is always present in science. However, this idea has little depth
as it would mean something like ‘metaphysics is always with us anywhere’, a
tautology. But the claim is denitely not a tautology forMaxwell as thewhole
practical usefulness of empirical scientic research depends on recognising
the claim of comprehensibility. In the latter sense, acknowledging the com-
prehensibility of science plays the role of a guiding light for science but in a
still dierent way compared to the traditional understanding of the role of
metaphysical claims. Among the latter, there are such that have become em-
pirically testable over time. Comprehensibility of the universe can never be
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testable in principle. However, it makes a dierence whether the researcher
has to presume the comprehensibility of the universe before starting to come
forward with research hypotheses or she does so in the course of practical
research. For Maxwell, the latter is the case. e researcher has to have
the condence of the universe being comprehensible while she is engaged
in practical research. Maxwell argues that this means acknowledging meta-
physical assumptions in science. Rein Vihalemm, who seconds to Joseph
Rouse, claims that we cannot engage in practical research at all if we do not
presume the possibility to interact with the real world (Vihalemm 2011, 58).
ere is no reason for the researcher to presume anything.e possibility to
interact is simply there, in the way metaphysical assumptions are present in
SE but are not acknowledged by the researcher. But, according to Maxwell,
they have to be accounted for, i.e., the researcher has to move over to AOE.
Aer all, there is a need to specify what it means to have metaphysics
in science. It may well be that the only way to understand the position is to
recognise the practice of science in the sense of Joseph Rouse. We engage in
problem-solving by applying the scientic method and, while experiencing
a dialogue with nature, recognise the constant need to believe in the com-
prehensibility of the universe. Is it metaphysics or methodology? Possibly
neither. It may be simply a practical principle that enables practical realism
to rule.
Now, it may seem that the dierence between AOE and SE as charac-
terized by Nicholas Maxwell is indeed very small. Science as SE works and
includes a small amount of metaphysics but the scientists themselves do not
notice that. Science as AOE involves scientists who acknowledge that they
have some (at least one) metaphysical assumption that does not really in-
uence their work, as they would conduct their research in the same way
anyway. Aer all, this single principle perhaps need not be called a meta-
physical assumption at all.
However, as might be expected, Maxwell has more to oer. Giving pref-
erence to unied theories can be connected to the quest for explanatory the-
ories. Such quest need not presume anything metaphysical (Vicente 2010).
In his response to this observation, Maxwell suddenly introduces the issue
of physics seeking truth. If so, then it is really legitimate to claim that dis-
unied theories are considered false by physicists. Still, Maxwell recognises
that in some contexts that he calls purely theoretical, physics might aim at
explanation and not put truth to the foreground (Maxwell 2015, 17). Obvi-
ously, it is easier to explain the world based on unity than disunity. Under
such circumstances, however, it is not necessary to call disunied theories
false.
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Maxwell claims that unied theories and also laws are accepted in prefer-
ence to more empirically successful disunied rivals in contexts where truth
doesmatter, such as building bridges or designing aeroplanes (Maxwell 2015,
17). Truth does matter here to the extent that empirical predictions have to
be true.
is is a position that practical realism would not accept, at least not in
the terms of some kind of general theoretical truth. However, the example
of bridges and aeroplanes could be accepted by practical realists from the
point of view of explanatory truth. Still, this is not the truth that practical
realism is aer but rather practice as such from the perspective of solutions
that work but also facilitate our connections to the world. is view is very
close to the Marxist understanding of practice. is resemblance has been
fully recognised by Vihalemm but is perhaps not important to Maxwell.
While introducing practical realism, Vihalemm gives real credit to
Marx’s understanding of practice. Interestingly, there is also a connection to
Maxwell’s view, although a somewhat remote one. According to Vihalemm,
Marx has been interpreted too supercially in this respect. Karl Marx’s un-
derstanding of practice is not a trivial notion adhering to the everyday activ-
ity of humans. It is a reference to human interaction with reality and there-
fore very important from the point of view of making sense of scientic re-
search. For example, in the very rst thesis about Ludwig Feuerbach Marx
writes:
e main defect of all hitherto-existing materialism—that of Feuer-
bach included—is that the Object [der Gegenstand], actuality, sensu-
ousness, are conceived only in the form of the object [Objekts], or
of contemplation [Anschauung], but not as human sensuous activity,
practice [Praxis], not subjectively. Hence it happened that the active
side, in opposition to materialism, was developed by idealism—but
only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sen-
suous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects [Objekte],
dierentiated from thought-objects, but he does not conceive human
activity itself as objective [gegenständliche] activity. In e Essence
of Christianity [Das Wesen des Christenthums], he therefore regards
the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while
practice is conceived and dened only in its dirty-Jewish form of ap-
pearance [Erscheinungsform] . . . (Marx 1845)
Even more importantly, Marx emphasises in the second thesis:
e question whether objective truth can be attributed to human
thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man
must prove the truth, i.e. the reality and power; the this-sidedness
[Diesseitigkeit] of this thinking, in practice. e dispute over the re-
ality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a
purely scholastic question. Marx (1845)
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Obviously, theMarxist understanding of practice is an important source
of practical realism. What is the connection to AOE, one may wonder. It
would perhaps be dicult to track down a close connection, although the
emphasis on practice is denitely important in the thinking of Maxwell. In
the last thesis of Marx about Feuerbach, however, we nd the same aim
in Marxism and in Maxwell’s approach that develops upon AOE. It is the
idea that describing the world is not enough. e world has to be changed
(Marx 1845). Unfortunately, the attempts to change the world according to
the Marxist principles did not produce favourable results in the long run.
Does this mean that following Maxwell’s call for a revolution in the aca-
demia is doomed as well? Obviously, it is too early to say. Maxwell has been
calling for a revolution in the academia or wisdom revolution in several of
his works. A successful wisdom revolution presumes AOE that has to be de-
veloped into aim-oriented rationality (Maxwell 2010). Aer all, Maxwell’s
revolution would be much smaller than the Marxist one, as it applies only
to a segment of society, the academia. In the end, however, Maxwell calls
for changing the whole world as the result of a better, more reasonable or-
ganisation of the academia that should produce results of scientic research
that really help in resolving the real problems that humanity is facing. In
that respect, both Marx and Maxwell share the idealist dream of contribut-
ing to the wellbeing of humankind by means of introducing a new proper
philosophy.
Rein Vihalemm is looking for a new proper philosophy as well, but only
as far as making sense of science is at stake. ere is no idealist hope of
changing the whole world to the better here. However, we cannot deny the
inuence of proper understanding of science to making sense of research
results that may benet our everyday life.
It seems that we have lost sight of metaphysics for quite a while. To some
extent, this is perhaps really so. However, we have not lost sight of practice.
Aer all, on the one hand, Maxwell’s AOE is an attempt to reconcile meta-
physics with the practical approach to science. On the other hand, the prac-
tical approach to science needs some inner framework to hold it together.
e idea of Maxwell is that this cannot be done from the outside. Science as
a practice has to be glued together from inside.
e practical approach to science brings together AOE and practical re-
alism.e latter leaves any kind ofmetaphysics out of the picture. Vihalemm
kept adhering to his naturalist attitude to the study of science and while it
may be enough for making sense of science, it is not enough for guiding it
further. According to Maxwell, metaphysics is necessary for fullling the
latter role. To be more precise, there have to be nontestable assumptions in
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science that guide it further.e traditional role of metaphysics is preserved
but it is positioned dierently.
5. Conclusion
Nicholas Maxwell and Rein Vihalemm share a similar approach to science.
Science is a practical activity that enables us humans to have an ongoing
dialogue with reality that yields quite special results. Knowledge that we
obtain as the result of scientic research into nature or society is the most
reliable information about the world out there. Still, we cannot be content
with obtaining just knowledge. is knowledge has to be useful. It has to
help us in solving real problems of living, as Maxwell calls them.
e article’s focus has been on assessing the need for metaphysical as-
sumptions in science. According to Maxwell, we need them for the purpose
of making sense of the progress that science is making. According to the
practical realist approach of Rein Vihalemm, however, nothing metaphysi-
cal is needed in science. We canmake perfect sense of the progress of science
if we understand the practical nature of science properly and account for its
normative essence.
In conclusion, we have good reasons to believe that nontestable claims
are present in science and have to be accounted for. erefore, we cannot
do away with metaphysics completely. Science does include metaphysical
assumptions and it is better to acknowledge them. AOE is nothing magical
but it is a more adequate approach to making sense of science than SE is.
e dierence with practical realism remains. However, as the latter is not
a fully developed view, nothing conclusive can be said about it at this point.
Recognising the normative component in science may lead to the recogni-
tion of the metaphysical component of science aer all. Still, this is a topic
of future research into the matter.
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